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 Abstract 
Cybercrime has recently surpassed all other forms of crime in the United Kingdom, and has               
been acknowledged as a national priority. The purpose of this research is to analyse the               
cyber-investigation lifecycle: from the experience of the public when reporting cybercrime to            
call takers, through to the attending officers, officer(s) in charge, and the many units and roles                
involved in supporting cybercrime investigations.  
A large scale needs assessment was conducted within one of the largest police forces in               
England and Wales, involving focus groups and interviews with police staff and strategic             
leads across key units and roles. The results of the needs assessment document the current               
state of policing cybercrime in a UK police force, along with the improvements and needs               
that exist across the force and in specific units and roles. 
In total 125 needs were identified and further coded based on a thematic analysis. Common               
themes identified include: knowledge/training, communication, recording, software, roles,        
governance, procedures, resources, consistency, staffing, national input, face-to-face,        
interactions with the public, new capabilities, and triage. The most common needs were             
related to training and knowledge, communications, quality of recording, software,          
governance, procedures, resourcing, and national input. Due to the nature of the findings, it is               
likely that these may apply nationally, and this work can be used to reflect on the potential for                  
related issues in other police contexts.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovation and progress within information and communications technology continues to          
change the way businesses operate and how people interact with each other. Digital             
technologies bring efficiency and effectiveness to a range of endeavours, including           
criminality. Technology makes new crimes possible and old crimes can be conducted at             
unprecedented volume and speed. Cybercrime has recently surpassed all other forms of crime             
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in the United Kingdom, and has been acknowledged as a UK national priority (UK              
Government, 2015).  
Policing of cybercrime is a challenging task. Law enforcement and the law traditionally             
struggles to keep up with new technology and digital threats. Many cases can involve digital               
evidence, and crimes can be entirely digital and dependent on technology, or can be further               
enabled or facilitated by technology. However, cybercrime is not exclusively a technical            
problem: there are a large number of organisational roles and police staff involved in the               
policing of crimes with a digital element, many of whom have limited technical knowledge.  
The purpose of this research is to analyse the cyber-investigation lifecycle: from the             
experience of the public when reporting cyber crime to call takers, through to the attending               
officers, officer(s) in charge, and the many units and roles supporting cybercrime            
investigations. A large scale needs assessment was conducted within one of the largest police              
forces in England and Wales, involving focus groups and interviews with police staff and              
strategic leads across key units and roles.  
The results of the needs assessment document the current state of policing cybercrime in a               
UK police force, along with the improvements and needs that exist across the force and in                
specific units and roles. 
2. Literature Review 
This section provides background based on a summary of related literature and work in order               
to provide context for the needs assessment. The literature was reviewed based on academic              
database and Internet searches for literature related to cybercrime and policing, with a focus              
on academic efforts that have been made to appraise the situation: for example, related needs               
assessment work. Notably, although there is excessive recognition of the problem, there was             
a dearth of literature providing detailed insight. The structural and funding situation for             
cybercrime policing in the UK, and within West Yorkshire Police is also described to provide               
the reader with further context regarding the needs assessment results presented in later             
sections. 
2.1. Cybercrime Globally 
Cybercrime is a growing and global phenomenon, which law enforcement agencies must            
react and respond to. Organised cybercrime activities accounts for more than 80% of             
cybercrime acts. Cybercrime suffers from underreporting, where 80% of individual victims of            
cybercrime do not report the crime to the police due to a lack of awareness of victimisation                 
and reporting mechanisms among other causes. Cybercrime rates recorded by police are            
associated with the level of development of a country and its specialised police capacity,              
rather than underlying crime rates ​(UNODC, 2013)​. Cybercrime investigations were found to            
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require a mix of traditional and new policing techniques to deal with electronic data storage               
and real-time data flows. 
Investigation and analysis of cybercrime can be hindered and complicated through difficulties            
encountered in obtaining valid criminal evidence and supporting intelligence from numerous           
networked devices distributed globally (Hunton, 2009). Cybercrime investigation is         
complicated by the fact that legislation and procedures differ across jurisdictions, including            
the admissibility of evidence (Europol, 2007). Differences exist, at a global level, in respect              
of cybercrime and these are driven by legislative and procedural variation and differential             
public expectation in respect of cyber security. Legislative difference between legal           
jurisdictions makes concealment and evasion a major opportunity for the cybercriminals           
(Hunton, 2009)​. Council of Europe of 2001 provides a common legal framework on             
cybercrime ​(Broadhurst and Chang, 2013)​. Legislation not only varies between regions or            
countries, there are also considerable differences within jurisdictions. In analysing the trends            
and challenges of cybercrime in Asia, ​(Broadhurst and Chang, 2013) observe that almost half              
of the internet users in the Asia and Pacific region are located in China and that this reflects                  
an apparent ‘digital divide’ in the level of internet participation within Asian countries.             
(Broadhurst and Chang, 2013) further mention that of all the countries in the Asia and Pacific                
region, only Japan has signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. However,             
there is limited support of the convention among many Asian countries. The UK has a more                
successful history than, for example Saudi Arabia, in developing effective legislation against            
cybercrime ​(Moafa, 2014)​.  
The cost of cybercrime to the EU is estimated at 13 billion euros per year, and based on share                   
of individual country GDP, the cost for UK is estimated to be 2 billion euros yearly ​(Armin et                  
al., 2015)​. 
Academic institutions can play a vital role in preventing cybercrime by educating and             
training professionals, and by informing the law and policy development. Public and private             
partnerships are also important for cybercrime prevention ​(UNODC, 2013) ​. 
2.2. Cybercrime and Policing in the UK 
In the United Kingdom (UK), traditional crime has continued to fall (Casciani, 2015).             
According to an official estimate of fraud and cybercrime from The Office for National              
Statistics (ONS), cybercrime is increasing and has surpassed all other forms of crime in the               
United Kingdom (NCA and HSIG, 2016). The National Security Strategy has categorised            
cybercrime and cyber attacks as a Tier One threat to national security, at the same tier of                 
threat as ​international ​terrorism (UK Government, 2015; Cabinet Office, 2015).  
Categories of cybercrime include ​cyber-dependent crime (or “pure cybercrime”), forms of           
crime that only exist digitally, and ​cyber-enabled crime​ , crimes that can be conducted with or               
without digital devices, but that are carried out with digital devices. While national and              
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regional law enforcement structures exist that are dedicated to confronting cyber-dependant           
crime, local police forces are required to deal with increasing levels of cyber-enabled crime,              
and digital evidence associated with all kinds of crime (also known as digital footprint and               
cyber-facilitated crime). For example, when investigating the impact and seriousness of           
online romance scams, ​Whitty and Buchanan (2012) observed that an estimated 230,000            
British citizens may have fallen victim to this crime and that there was a need to look at ways                   
of facilitating greater public reporting of such crimes.  
2.3. Needs Assessments of Policing Cybercrime 
A literature search was conducted to identify related needs assessment studies on cybercrime             
and digital evidence that have been performed both internationally and in the UK. 
In the UK, HMIC published a study of cybercrime and policing based on interviews with six                
police forces, non-governmental organisations, and interviews with victims of digital crime           
(HMIC, 2015) ​. 
There is a mixed picture about the extent to which police provided good quality advice to the                 
victims of digital crime ​(HMIC, 2015)​. The victim’s perception of an investigator’s            
competence was based on the officer’s ability to provide thoughtful advice and practical             
guidance to protect the victim from any further criminality rather than the depth of officer’s               
knowledge of digital crime. 
An important issue regarding cybercrime is that the lack of understanding among police             
forces regarding the scale of digital crime. (HMIC, 2015) suggests that an appropriate level of               
understanding will allow for police forces to make sound, evidenced-based decisions in            
relation to critical areas such as operational structures, procurement, and learning and            
development. 
There are two important issues related to the victims of cybercrime that need addressing at               
both local and regional level. These are police awareness of vulnerabilities of cyber victims              
and the ability to collect digital evidences from the victims. (HMIC, 2015)  states: 
“Many victims mentioned that they had carefully collected the evidence of the digital             
crime but that the investigating officer had not taken it, when offered. …a significant              
cause for concern is the police’s failure fully to recognise the vulnerability of the              
victims of digital crime.” 
Other conclusions from the study included the importance of improved leadership and            
governance structures, and that each chief constable needs to ensure appropriate training,            
guidance, awareness of online anti-social behaviour and support to provide to victims,            
appropriate levels of digital capability, and clarity over referring cases to Action Fraud. 
Also, in the UK, a related needs assessment was overseen in 2012 by the West Yorkshire                
Police and Crime Commissioner, which looked at general crime in the area. ​In assessing the               
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local threats, risks and harm at a local force level in the form of strategic assessment, one of                  
police priorities was of implementing Capability Delivery Plans for the Strategic Policing            
Requirements (SPR). One of the crimes associated with the plans was the cyber incident              
(West Yorkshire Police, 2012)​. 
A needs assessment can be a first step toward developing a national research and              
development (R&D) agenda for cyber-attack investigative technology. Such an approach has           
been adopted in the United States by the Institute for Security Technology Studies, Their              
work provides an insight into the technological obstacles facing law enforcement during            
cyber-attack investigations and thus empowers law enforcement through the provision of           
appropriate knowledge through which to deliver solutions ​(Koper et al., 2009)​. The report             
suggests,  
“The next step is to identify available technological solutions that address the            
requirements outlined in the needs assessment. The third step is to produce a             
gap-analysis report identifying the critical areas, or gaps, where scientific research           
should be focused. The ultimate goal is a national agenda for research and             
development of law enforcement tools and technologies which scientists across the           
country can use as a guide in determining where to devote their research efforts.” 
Stambaugh (2001), from The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), conducted a study with one              
hundred and twenty six participants from urban and rural jurisdictions and different agencies             
in the US. The study was performed in order to identify the issues related to electronic crime.                 
The study identified ten critical issues: public awareness, data and reporting, uniform training             
and certification courses, management assistance for onsite electronic crime units and task            
forces, updated laws, cooperation with the high tech industry, special research and            
publications, management awareness and support, investigative and forensic tools, and          
structuring a computer crime unit. The concluding remarks are that responses need to be both               
quick and coordinated. 
Rogers and Seigfried (2004) performed a needs assessment in the area of computer forensics.              
Participants were asked to list the top 5 issues in cyber forensics (computer forensics) and the                
data were studied using descriptive statistical analysis. The responses were categorised into            
ten types. The respondents, a total of sixty, were a mixture of researchers, students,              
academics, and private/public sector practitioners in the area of computer forensics. A single             
open ended question was posted online, where the respondents were asked to list the top 5                
issues related to computer forensics. The answers were divided into ten categories and the              
most reported topic was the issue of Education/Training/Certification (ETC) (see also           
Stambaugh 2001). The authors concluded that there was a lack of standardised approaches             
and professional certification in the area of computer forensics. 
Harichandran et al. (2016) reported on a broad need analysis survey performed in the area of                
cyber forensics and they claimed it was the first study of its kind in a decade after Rogers and                   
Seigfried (2004). They collected data from ninety nine respondents based on a fifty one              
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question survey. The feedback from the survey indicates a need for more funding and              
personnel; better ETC, tools, and communications; updated laws; and research on cloud and             
mobile forensics. The needs assessment included participants from different parts of the            
world and was distributed online through Twitter, LinkedIn cyber forensics groups, list            
servers and email contacts. This survey also recorded the demographics of the respondents. A              
direct comparison with the 2004 survey results was performed and it was found that ETC and                
technologies did not change as priorities. Many of the results supported recent findings that              
tools need to improve and greater standardisation is needed for laws, tools, education and              
communication.  
Davis (2010) conducted a questionnaire based survey with eighteen items which was            
developed to measure the impact of cybercrime on investigations in the state of North              
Carolina, in the US. There were one hundred and twenty seven completed questionnaires             
with respondents highlighting issues with investigating crimes with a cyber component. The            
findings pointed to a lack of equipment, training and personnel as the main issues. Based on                
the comments section of the survey, it appears that investigators and prosecutors have             
different values, knowledge and expectation when dealing with cyber enabled crimes. 
In combatting electronic crime, a needs assessment of state and local law enforcement             
agencies in the United States is aimed to serve as a catalyst for creating timely initiatives that                 
address both short and longer term needs ​(Stambaugh et al., 2001)​. This report grouped the               
most frequently voiced concerns into the following critical ten areas of needs: Public             
awareness, Data and reporting, Uniform Training and certification courses, Onsite          
management assistance for electronic crime units and task forces, updated laws, Cooperation            
with the high-tech industry, Special research and publications, Management awareness and           
support, Investigative and forensic tools and Structuring a computer crime unit ​(Stambaugh et             
al., 2001)​. In addition to these ten critical needs, there are two overarching issues which               
emerged from this assessment: quick progress towards meeting these needs, and a            
coordinated approach facilitated by a centralised gateway ​(Stambaugh et al., 2001)​. 
Overall, therefore, previous literature suggests a number of broad themes of challenge facing             
police organisations seeking to successfully engage with the growing ubiquity of cyber and             
cyber-enabled crime. These themes might be identified as: ‘Infrastructure’ (including the           
development of national and organisational structures to facilitate effective practice);          
‘Resources’ (including tools, funding, equipment and personnel); ‘Training’ (including         
certification); ‘Interface with the Public’ (including officer awareness, victim support and           
evidential awareness of first responders), ‘Processes’ (including data recording and sharing of            
data both internally and with external agencies) and ‘External Contexts’ (including industry            
links, national agendas for cybercrime and the effectiveness of existing legislation).  
2.4. Cybercrime Units Structure in UK 
The NCCU (National Cyber Crime Unit), which is part of the NCA (National Crime              
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Agency), is responsible for the UK’s response to cybercrime. The NCCU provides specialist             
capabilities to its partners and coordinates the national response to the most serious of              
cybercrime threats. The NCCU has been set up with funding from the National Cyber              
Security Programme, which supports development and transformation of the UK’s cyber           
capabilities across Government. Figure 1.1 shows the structure of cybercrime units in UK.             
The NCCU has strong links with the ROCUs (Regional Organised Crime Units) and local              
Police Services, sharing information, intelligence and expertise to enhance knowledge of the            
cyber threat in order to prioritise operational and disruption activity most effectively. All             
these partners usually conduct operations in partnership. 
The Regional Organised Crime Units are sub-units of the NCCU and they provide specialised              
services on a regional basis. There are 9 ROCUs in the England and Odyssey is the ROCU                 
for the four forces of Yorkshire and the Humber. The ROCU network has been considered               
best practice internationally and has been adopted by law enforcement agencies in other             
countries (Cabinet Office, 2016). Odyssey provides specialist services such as cyber           
investigation, digital forensic examination, financial investigation and specialist intelligence         
resources as well as helping to tackle serious drug trafficking and firearms offenses across              
force boundaries.  
 
Figure 1 Structure of cybercrime units in UK 
The development of digital capabilities across the police service is being brought together             
under the Digital Investigation and Intelligence Framework (Scriven and Herdale, 2015),           
endorsed by the chief constables in April, 2015 ​(HMIC, 2015)​. The designated priority             
areas are ​(Digital Forensics and Crime, 2016)​: 
● developing partnerships with academia and industry 
● enhancing awareness of digital evidence among officers 
● developing career paths for digital specialists. 
As a result of the above framework, there has been an establishment of a capabilities               
management group by the National Police Chief’s Council, the National Crime Agency, the             
College of Policing and the Home Office, chaired by Chief Constable Kavanagh ​(HMIC,             
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2015)​. A simplification of the police governance structure to deal effectively with digital             
crime has been undertaken. However, the funding process remains complex. Consequently, 
“None of these (Capability Development Programme, the National Cyber Security          
Programme, the Police Innovation Fund, and a force’s own funding from council            
tax precepts or the Police Grant) funding streams has the development of digital             
policing capabilities as its core function. As a consequence, the ability to lead             
national change is reliant on the ability of the police service to bid successfully              
across a range of funding.”  ​(HMIC, 2015, p.57) 
2.5. Police Structure and Units 
The force studied is one of the largest in the country serving a population of over 2 million,                  
with over 4,000 (full time equivalent, FTE) police officers and over 4,000 staff (FTE)              
including over 500 PCSOs (as of March 2016). The force is divided into police districts, and                
covers varied topography that combine busy cities and towns with quiet villages and rural              
locations. There is a varied and diverse range of people from diverse ethnic cultural and               
economic backgrounds. 
The force is at the forefront of tackling cyber-enabled crime, leading many initiatives with the               
involvement of partners from various sectors including voluntary, financial and academia.           
Regular working groups and boards include the Strategic Board for Cybercrime, Tactical            
Board for Cybercrime, and the Independent Advisory Group of Cybercrime.  
The force has one of the first cybercrime units across the UK police forces, the Cyber Crime                 
Team (CCT). The CCT is a new role, designed to provide support to frontline officers to                
recover and make use of (potentially overlooked) digital evidence and to assist local police              
with digital investigations. The focus groups were conducted less than six months after the              
CCT unit was created. 
3. Aims and Methods 
3.1. Identification and Engagement of Stakeholders 
The methodology for the Needs Assessment was driven by the requirement for a wide-scale              
evaluation of the needs of a wide range of internal stakeholders for cybercrime and digital               
evidence gathering in the force. Initial site visits involved meetings with the Cyber Crime              
Team (CCT) and Digital Forensic Units (DFU) to conduct a high-level what is analysis              
(Kaufman, 1981), documenting overall processes and information flow of cybercrime cases.           
Our Project Liaison within the police facilitated the identification of relevant groups,            
departments and units and also enabled engagement with them. By the end of the planning               
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period, internal stakeholder groups were identified which spanned the operations of the force. 
3.2. Research Strategy 
The nature of the needs assessment meant that a method was needed which would allow for                
large amounts of qualitative data to be generated around the ways in which cybercrime was               
dealt with, within the organisation; in particular in respect of systems and system             
effectiveness. To this end, two analytic tools were integrated into the research strategy. First,              
Kaufman’s Organizational Elements Model (OEM) (Kaufman, 1981) and, second, a          
traditional SWOT analysis (Reed and Vakola, 2006). The former was adopted as a means of               
allowing the team to differentiate between processes and outputs/outcomes in a complex            
organisation. The latter was adopted as a means of ensuring that both internal and external               
contexts were engaged with when assessing organisational viability in respect of improving            
cybercrime investigation. 
3.3. Data Generation 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with identified cohorts. Where possible police          
officers and staff were interviewed in focus groups separate from the strategic leads; so as to                
ask big picture questions from those in a strategic position, and also to enable staff to speak                 
more freely regarding operational challenges. Interviews were framed around an interview           
schedule that reflected the OEM differentiation between Inputs, Processes, Products, Outputs           
and Outcomes whilst simultaneously differentiating between present and ideal practice. They           
also included consideration of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. These          
methods, and the structure of the interviews, allowed freedom for unanticipated themes to             
emerge throughout the interview so long as they pertained to the broad areas being addressed. 
For the strategic lead interviews, the OEM model was explicitly explained, as represented in              
diagrammatic form in Table 1. 
Table 1: Kaufman's Organizational Elements Model (OEM) 
 
INPUTS 
PROCESSE
S 
(Means) 
PRODUCTS 
(En route 
results) 
OUTPUTS 
(Delivered to 
society) 
OUTCOME
S 
(Effects in or 
for society) 
WHAT IS      
WHAT SHOULD BE      
 
For the officers and staff focus groups, the OEM model wasn’t explicitly explained, and these               
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had the addition of specific questions relating to key areas of their role. For example, in                
respect of the Contact Communication Centre, the focus group were asked ‘Do you think that               
members of the public receive a similar level of service when reporting cybercrime compared              
to traditional crimes?’. The interview schedules which detail these can be found in Appendix              
A (focus groups) and Appendix B (interviews with strategic leads).  
Interviews were transcribed by a reputable transcription company. 
3.4. Data Analysis 
Following transcription of the interviews, the resultant data was loaded into NVivo so that it               
could be effectively analysed. To allow for an effective analysis of the qualitative data that               
respected both the OEM and SWOT models, the following nodes were created for each              
interview: 
● INPUTS (IS) 
● INPUTS (SHOULD BE) 
● PROCESSES (IS) 
● PROCESSES (SHOULD BE) 
● NEEDS (PROCESSES) 
● PRODUCTS (IS) 
● PRODUCTS (SHOULD BE) 
● OUTPUTS (IS) 
● OUTPUTS (SHOULD BE) 
● OUTCOMES (IS) 
● OUTCOMES (SHOULD BE) 
● STRENGTHS 
● WEAKNESSES 
● OPPORTUNITIES 
● THREATS 
Once the data was coded under each of these nodes, needs were identified based on the OEM,                 
and these needs were the subject of a thematic analysis (Braun and Clark, 2006), which was                
conducted to allow for more nuanced themes to emerge from the broader categories of data.               
This allowed for unanticipated issues to be identified whilst, simultaneously, allowing the            
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research to meet the requirements of the organisation. Given the qualitative nature of the data               
and interpretivist mode of analysis applied to it, the team were mindful to heed challenges               
pertaining to the ‘Transferability’ of findings (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Similarly, the            
research team have been careful not to overstate the findings in relation to the data generated                
(Malterud, 2001). 
3.5. Sample 
The following interviews and focus groups were undertaken: 
● Contact Communication Centre (4 participants) 
● Strategic Leads for Training (3 participants) 
● Covert Authorities Bureau (4 participants) 
● Cyber Crime Team (2 participants) 
● District Strategic Lead (1 Participant) 
● Dedicated Source Unit (2 participants) 
● Digital Forensics Unit (3 participants) 
● District Staff (7 participants) 
● Economic Crime Unit (2 participants) 
● Strategic Lead for Communications (1 participant) 
● Strategic Leads for Intelligence (2 participants) 
● Investigative Analysts and Researchers  (6 participants) 
● Homicide and Major Enquiry Team (2 participants) 
● Strategic Lead for Safeguard and Central Governance (1 participant) 
● Strategic Lead for Murder and Serious Crime (1 participant) 
● Technical Support Unit (2 participant) 
● Telecoms staff (2 participants) 
● Strategic Lead for Telecoms (1 participant) 
To date, this is the largest scale needs assessment of cybercrime policing research project. 
3.6. Needs and Recommendations 
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Throughout the needs assessment wherever there is a tangible difference between the ‘Is’ and              
‘Should Be’ elements of the OEM analysis, needs and recommendations are identified.  
3.7. Ethics 
Research with the police generally leads to consideration of ethical issues. This research was              
no exception. The research strategy was developed in conjunction with the Head of             
Cybercrime for the force to ensure that ethical considerations of police stakeholders were             
understood and respected. These typically included confidentiality, anonymity, informed         
consent and sensitivities around operational considerations. 
A participant information and consent sheet was developed and used with every respondent             
(Appendix C). The consent sheet ensured informed consent and allowed for respondents to             
withdraw from participation at any stage without explanation. Respondents were made fully            
aware that the research team did not require information that could jeopardise ongoing             
operations. Similarly, respondents were made fully aware that their responses would be            
anonymised in any reports or publications which drew on data generated through their             
involvement. At all times, the British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics (2016) was              
adhered with. Likewise, the research team submitted an ethics application for scrutiny            
through the appropriate ethics arrangements at Leeds Beckett University. This passed ethical            
scrutiny. Finally, members of the research team were vetted using the force’s security             
processes. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Unit and Role Needs 
This section provides an overview and discussion of the needs identified in relation to the               
units and roles that were interviewed. 
4.1.1. Contact Communication Centre (CCC) and Strategic      
Lead for Communications 
The two most common themes of need for the Contact Communication Centre (CCC) were              
related to training, and to recording. Interviews with the CCC staff and with the strategic lead                
for communications emphasised the importance of improving knowledge and formal training           
to enable call takers to be better equipped to deal with cybercrime and digital evidence: so                
that they can more effectively advise callers and preserve digital evidence. As the first point               
of contact for victims of cybercrime, this is crucial for both supporting the public and               
influencing the success of subsequent investigations. Much of the knowledge to advise call             
takers in respect of preserving evidence is not routinely disseminated via structured training.             
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Currently there is a wide range of knowledge, and cybercrimes are not as readily understood               
by call takers compared to traditional crimes. Effective training is currently compromised            
due to a backlog of work. Current training packages (including eLearning packages, which             
were described as easy to pass without understanding) should be assessed to ensure they are               
fit-for-purpose, and more formal training processes should be considered.  
The interactions with Action Fraud, and the way data was recorded was described as              
problematic. Part of the central key process of liaising with callers and to place information               
on Storm involves assessing whether or not a cyber related call necessitates a referral to               
Action Fraud. Once referred call takers cannot advise callers on the progress of cases.              
According to the interviewees there is a need for a review of information-sharing with Action               
Fraud and available tags/in-codes for cyber and digital and recording systems. Question sets             
should be reviewed in relation to cyber-enabled crime, and mandatory questions should be             
considered. To improve the crime/incident recording process, the strategic lead interviewee           
suggested that there is a need for a CRM (Customer Record Management System). This              
could draw on other systems such as Storm and Niche to provide more information to the call                 
takers at the initial stage. There was also some need to further define procedures for               
cyber-related activities, such as how to direct the public to provide digital information to the               
police.  
The findings from the communications focus groups are consistent with the comms related             
comments from the district staff focus group, and also comments from Cyber Crime Team              
(CCT) staff who expressed a concern that call takers might not be prepared to advise callers                
how to preserve digital evidence.  
4.1.2. Strategic Leads for Intelligence 
The most common theme related to the Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) and intelligence was              
the need to improve communication: this includes raising awareness of key terms of             
reference, lines of communication, and better defining and communicating roles in terms of             
cybercrime and the units that deal digital aspects of an investigation. It was suggested that               
there exists a pronounced confusion around defining both cybercrime and the roles of the              
CCU and the DFU. There was also the need to explore options to overcome the geographical                
dislocation of the various units, which has an impact on the degree to which units collaborate                
and share knowledge. This need to improve communication was a common theme amongst             
many of the interviews. Confusion over key terms of reference is also linked to the need to                 
improve reporting of cybercrime, and the flagging of intelligence with a “cyber flag”. 
Additionally, the CIU unit were aware of potential process improvements, based on previous             
reviews, which had not yet been implemented.  
4.1.3. Covert Authorities Bureau (CAB) 
Although a core function of the Covert Authorities Bureau (CAB) is to process and assist in                
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granting authorities, there is a significant lack of national clarity regarding the interpretation             
of laws regarding access to various kinds of data on the Internet. An integral part of the                 
processes of CAB is related to open source intelligence (OSINT) although there is some              
ambiguity about the the application of RIPA to the context of intelligence gathering.             
Training is of limited use according to the interviewee where team members learn more by               
external means and through serving what amounts to an informal ‘apprenticeship’.  
There is also a need for a review of possibilities to enhance application submission through               
modifications to Charter Systems. This is related to a need that arises from the Telecoms               
interviews, where they stated that Charter needs additional workflows better suited to            
Telecom’s needs. 
The most common theme in needs was improvements to communications. According to the             
CAB interviewees there is a need to explore possibilities of offering a platform for CAB               
representatives to liaise directly with the victims of cybercrime. The CAB interviewees also             
suggested that more should be done to raise awareness of cybercrime in public and within the                
force, the various police roles need to be clarified in relation to ​cybercrime and use of digital                 
investigation techniques. Face-to-face communication across the force was also described as           
needed further, and suffered from geographical separation. Comments related to the need to             
improve internal and external communications were common across the needs assessment. 
4.1.4. Telecoms Unit and Strategic Lead for      
Telecommunications 
Although somewhat related to the role that CAB has in authorising covert authorities,             
Telecoms also deal with authority requests, except for accessing those telecommunications           
data for which there is a much higher volume of requests. Although these functions both               
relate to sections of RIPA legislation, in practice these units necessarily function substantially             
differently. Despite this, Telecoms make use of the same Charter system, which needs to be               
adapted to better suit telecommunication authority requests (potentially through additional          
workflows). Another related software/process need is improvements to processing through          
further automation of various functions, such as: the Received Data Handover Interface            
(RDHI) for automated data requests, and ADM for data standardisation so that analysts             
receive more meaningful outputs ready for analysis.  
It is apparent that further national input is required to enable Telecoms to make better use of                 
the RDHI and ADM outputs from the Home Office. Telecoms would also benefit from more               
national input on establishing relationships with further technology companies. 
Another common theme of need is to engage in further proactive support to the force in terms                 
of telecommunications requests and analysis. Based on the interviews, it was suggested that             
officers need more proactive support to to identify potential lines of enquiry based on digital               
evidence from communication service providers, and to understand the appropriate and           
proportionate data that can be used in cases. Telecoms staff were particularly interested in              
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being able to be more proactive, and provide this support directly. However, this is not               
possible at scale without further staff resourcing (or substantially improved automation of            
tasks). Telecoms staff are trained to conduct certain kinds of analysis on communications             
data; however, this is reportedly an underutilised skill set. Predominantly Telecoms staff time             
is spent reviewing (mostly telecoms) requests for necessity, proportionality, and intrusion,           
using portals to access data from service providers, and returning data to successful             
applicants; with processes in place for escalating urgent requests.  
There is overlap between CCT, DMIs, and Telecoms, in providing the above support; and is               
the source of some contention over who are best placed to do so. In interviews CCT staff                 
described Telecoms as being reluctant to provide or internally publish a list of service              
providers and resources available for request. In Telecoms interviews it was stated that DMIs              
want a “shopping list”, without having had the training to properly understand issues around              
proportionality. Therefore, where the above support is provided by DMIs/CCT (or other            
intermediaries) they need to have increased training regarding proportionate means for data            
requests, to avoid overburdening Telecoms. In line with this, if DMIs and CCT are to               
properly fulfil their role of directing officers on cyber investigations they do need to be more                
aware of what Telecoms are capable of doing for investigations. Related to the above, there is                
a need for better communication and cooperation between the cyber-related units to clarify             
roles and responsibilities. 
4.1.5. Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) 
According to the suggestions of members of the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU), increasingly             
they need to differentiate between ‘traditional’ and ‘cyber’ sources which necessitates to            
liaise with cyber investigators when special assistance is required. Illicit communities           
operating in cyberspace provide opportunities for potential future sources for the unit.            
However, a weakness identified by interviewees was the lack of cyber expertise within the              
unit. It was suggested by DSU interviewees that this was linked to the age of staff. The need                  
for improved knowledge and cyber skill sets was a consistent theme for the needs of DSU. 
Two possibilities for future-proofing the role includes increasing collaboration with other           
cyber units (such as CCT), and increasing cyber capability within DSU. Increasing            
collaboration would require supporting staff (such as members of CCT) to have a higher              
security clearance than is currently the case. Increasing capability within DSU is tied to both               
training, and potentially recruitment. Training requirements include further knowledge of          
cybercrime and how this relates to sources of intelligence, and use of digital sources for               
intelligence work (rather than the generic cyber training currently available). Embedding           
research and cyber expertise within the Dedicated Source Unit would require specialist            
knowledge input in order to ensure recruits have appropriate skills. 
Given the technical expertise that is available within the CCT, it would appear to be an                
opportunity to further formalise collaborations in the area of digital sources of intelligence             
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work. The resourcing implications would need to be considered. 
4.1.6. Homicide and Major Enquiry Team (HMET) and       
Strategic Lead for Murder and Serious Crime 
The Homicide and Major Enquiry Team (HMET) had recently started working with DMIs             
and the newly formed CCT. Needs identified based on the interviews indicate the importance              
of more clearly defining the roles of technical support units, improving communications and             
responsiveness, and cyber training for HMET.  
The work of the homicide team increasingly has a cyber dimension. Whilst, increasingly,             
members of the team have sufficient skills to undertake some of this work, HMET has the                
potential to draw substantially on the skills provided by the CCT. Largely, HMET appear to               
have developed a productive relationship with the unit. However, there is a need to reach               
further understanding between technical teams and HMET as how to best support their cases.              
This may be in the form of clearer remits for the scope of investigations (to avoid DMIs or                  
CCT from conducting digital investigations that are not in line with HMET’s expectations),             
or by illustrating to HMET the benefits of casting the digital investigation wider. In order to                
facilitate productive collaboration HMET require outputs with non-technical summaries. 
Substantial challenges appear to remain around training. Staff feel that greater provision is             
required around training to mitigate against legislative and technological change. Similarly,           
concern was voiced around the need for training to  be ongoing rather than ‘one off’. 
4.1.7. Economic Crime Unit (ECU) 
The Economic Crime Unit (ECU) focus group raised a range of challenges, including those              
related to resource availability, and knowledge/training. Many of the processes embedded in            
the work of ECU are related to investigating the financially motivated crimes that are              
increasingly recognised as having a substantial cyber-enabled component. An integral part of            
the process is the use of a triage system that focuses on responding to organised crime,                
vulnerable victims and substantial financial crime.  
Processes of evidence analysis are often lengthy and interviewees reported considerable           
delays (around 8 months) in reports on examination of seized electronic devices. It was              
suggested processes could be more efficient and timely with a better resourced CCT and              
DFU. Similarly there is a need to review how those with technical knowledge are best               
positioned to participate in investigations: including whether CCT should more directly lead            
or direct cyber-related investigations.  
Furthermore, responses indicate the need for a review of the technical knowledge, and the              
hardware and software resources within ECU. Other needs raised include: liaising with CPS             
in relation to technological aspects of cyber investigation and evidence; and exploring options             
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for most effective training styles and ensuring that training is fit-for-purpose.  
4.1.8. Technical Support Unit (TSU) 
There are substantial opportunities for increased cyber capabilities related to the Technical            
Support Unit (TSU) role of using technology to perform technical covert surveillance, which             
could directly impact on the intelligence/data they are able to produce. The needs identified              
for TSU are related to increasing capability and knowledge, defining what those capabilities             
should be, and increasing communication and cooperation between cyber-related units          
(including TSU, DFU, CCT).  
The unit interviewees suggested that they require further national guidance (and           
accreditation) on the covert cyber capabilities a TSU (or more broadly, a police force) is               
expected or recommended to have. There is the potential to increased covert cyber attack              
capabilities, including targeted keylogging and use of implants. Although the unit has some             
cyber capabilities, this could be vastly expanded via recruitment and training, or            
complemented via collaboration with other units in the force. Practice within the TSU is              
largely informed by staff self-directed learning and in-lab testing of techniques, without            
formal training on foundational concepts.  
Given the (reportedly underutilised) technical skill sets within CCT (including members of            
staff with ethical hacking and computer security degrees) there is the potential for CCT to               
become more involved in these activities to support TSU. However, this would require             
further clearance levels for CCT, and national guidance on appropriate legal authorities and             
the circumstances that these techniques would be authorised for use. 
4.1.9. Strategic Lead for Safeguarding and Central      
Governance  
Many of the processes embedded in the work of Safeguard and Central Governance relate to               
child safeguarding and include child sexual exploitation and cybercrime. According to the            
interviewee, there is a delay in processing child safeguarding cases because of the bottleneck              
caused by the amount of exhibits that need processing. Triaging improves backlog, but there              
is need for a review of triaging processes to better understand reliability and potentially              
improve confidence. 
Other areas of needs highlighted by the interviewee include: appropriate cyber training for             
staff dealing with cybercrime-related child safeguarding (staff engaged in safeguarding need           
related training), more effective case and resource management, ensuring a consistent and            
appropriate delivery of service across the districts (not all districts provide the same level of               
service to victims), and it was argued that there is the need to establish a process for                 
reviewing/monitoring registered sex offenders' digital devices. 
In the DFU focus group it was suggested that Safeguarding should be trained on the use of                 
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digital forensics triaging tools. 
4.1.10. Investigative Analysts and Researchers 
The investigative analysts and researchers interviewed reported the need for more cyber            
training, including open source intelligence (OSINT) skills, and other digital techniques           
relevant to their roles. There was also a lack clarity in the terminology around cybercrime, in                
terms of internal communication and also reporting. They also emphasised the lack of clarity              
over the role of the CCT and how this new role will work with analysts. Processes would be                  
improved through joined up computer systems within the organization, such as linked            
datasets, so that analysts have access to more consistent and complete views of the data               
available. 
4.1.11. District Strategic Lead 
During other interviews, this district was often mentioned as a good example within the force               
of a district that deals with cyber-enabled crime well, making good use of DMIs and other                
cybercrime related roles, such as District Phone Examiners. It has been suggested that other              
districts do not have the same level of response. DMIs play a pivotal role in the district by                  
running a dedicated mailbox for submitting questions on cyber related issues. According to             
the interviewee, a substantial aim is to upskill the members of the investigative team more               
generally in respect of cybercrime.  
The needs identified during the interview include those that relate to governance, procedures,             
and consistency: including a need for a strategic review of initiatives, recording procedures,             
and the need for further defined guidelines on evidence and disclosure. The fact that the               
various districts provide different levels of responsiveness to cybercrime needs to be            
reviewed. The interviewee raised some concerns regarding the filing (also known as, no             
further action (NFA)) of cases when there may in fact be digital lines of enquiry, which was                 
also raised as an issue in other interviews.  
4.1.12. District Staff (Various Roles) 
The district staff mixed focus group was made up of a variety of district and force support                 
roles, and the result was the identification of a cross section of needs across the force, many                 
of which were directly repeated in the results from other more focused groups. Many of the                
identified needs relate to training, including the consideration of delivery methods, and the             
need to increase knowledge to ensure call-takers and frontline police officers have            
appropriate levels of knowledge to identify and preserve evidence, and understand the            
technology (including mobile apps, platforms, and social media) to respond appropriately to            
members of the public. Less engagement with contemporary technology by the officers,            
according to the interviewees is limiting the ability of the officers to give appropriate advice.               
For example, raising awareness that telling someone to “turn off” Facebook, is not             
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appropriate advice to give regarding reports of harassment via social media.  
Communication internally and externally were also the subject of identified needs. The role             
of the call taker was considered a key factor in enhancing the overall process, and more                
bespoke question sets for call takers in relation to cybercrime, are seen as helpful in eliciting                
meaningful information, and for the recording and progression of a call. Action Fraud             
referrals were an example where improved communications and data sharing would           
potentially enable police to better track the progression of cases that have been referred to               
Action Fraud. There is also a need to improve role clarity, especially where there are cyber                
overlaps, such as cases including both a financial and cyber element (referral to ECU vs               
CCT). 
Finally, there is a need to ensure sufficient resourcing of stand-alone machines exists so that               
police can access online sources of information, as appropriate to an investigation. 
4.1.13. Cybercrime Trainers and the Strategic Lead for       
Training 
The Carrgate Training team delivers training packages addressing cybercrime, digital media           
and associated areas, many of which are provided by College of Policing. The need for               
improved training and knowledge was a common theme across the interviews conducted for             
the needs assessment, and the training team are also cognizant of the issues, raising similar               
points. There is a need to receive further input from police staff and officers into the training                 
that is provided, based on the goings on and needs of the force. The training material is in                  
need of updating, and the actual appropriateness of the delivery methods used need             
reviewing. Police personnel need to be given the time to effectively engage in training,              
self-directed learning, and refresher training (of which there needs to be a policy to introduce               
more). There was an acknowledgement that specialist units are in need of further specialist              
training.  
The training team also raised common force-wide issues including hardware and software            
resources, inconsistency between districts, and data sharing with Action Fraud. 
Given the importance of cyber skills, knowledge, and training, it seems that the training team               
is currently under resourced to address the demands, as per the needs identified in the needs                
assessment. Although resources are clearly a policy and budgetary issue, training staff would             
benefit from: more time to keep themselves up-to-date, engage in research/study, and            
subsequently update and develop new training materials.  
4.1.14. Digital Forensics Unit (DFU) 
The Digital Forensics Unit (DFU) have gone through various procedural changes and            
restructures over the years, including a major restructuring which took place while the needs              
assessment was taking place. One result of the restructuring was a loss of staff and experience                
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from within the unit. The focus group was productive, and one of the most technical, leading                
to a rich dataset, illuminating a number of needs within the unit, including quality of inputs,                
communication, and training.  
The issue of the backlog of exhibits to process in DFU units globally is well understood in                 
the literature, where in some cases DFU units can typically be 12 months behind. DFU had 9                 
months previous instituted on site and in lab triaging processes (in addition to outsourcing              
work) to reduce the backlog to an “​outstanding​ ” two months of backlog.  
Many of the needs identified relate to the quality of the inputs, and communication. The               
quality of incoming intelligence needs to be improved. DFU should also have early access to               
intelligence: before warrants are issued, to assess crime to inform course of action, and before               
warrants are served, to provide context to inform triaging work. DFU also require higher              
quality supporting information with requests from police officers, to provide context to the             
analysis to be done. This might be addressed with the ability to bounce forensic examination               
requests back to applicants for amendments and improved inputs. Also related to            
communication, is that DFU should provide a clearer set of types of analysis that DFU               
provides, with resources and staffing to match. For example, in-depth, analysis vs quick             
turnaround of phones. 
DFU were one of the more siloed units interviewed. Likely driven by the high demand on the                 
unit compared to the level of resources, the unit has very clearly defined inputs and outputs,                
and streamlined technical procedures to maximise turn around. However, there is a need to              
improve communication between units (including DFU, CCT, and Telecoms). 
DFU benefit from experienced team members who continue to innovate in terms of analysis              
techniques, including software written in-house, and a willingness to change tools and            
techniques. However, it was noted that new recruits can lack manual/fundamental analysis            
skills (relying on software to produce results). There is a need for updated training materials               
and CPD regarding core skills and new devices for DFU. There is also a need to improve                 
officer understanding regarding forensic examination outputs, and potentiality for training          
Safeguarding to make use of triaging tools. 
Regarding the processing of evidence there is a need to further formalise the triaging process,               
which is currently fluid. There is a need for procedures or checklists for on site triaging to                 
ensure Wi-Fi details are captured, NAS and online storage is searched/acquired, and hash             
scans and so on are conducted reliably. For analysis of cases there is a need to ensure that                  
further holistic analysis of the range of devices associated with cases are considered, rather              
than analysing devices in isolation. 
In terms of outputs, there is the need to further improve the outputs, by further automating                
report generation, including non-technical summaries of findings, and outputting files of           
mobile device extractions in a format that is easier for officers to access. 
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4.1.15. Cyber Crime Team (CCT) 
A number of needs for the Cyber Crime Team (CCT) were related to improving the quality of                 
input to the unit. There is a need for higher quality case recording and communication               
(correct flagging of cybercrime cases to enable actionable intel, and provisioning of expertise             
to cases), higher quality technical details of cases (IP addresses, URLs, and usernames). The              
CCT would also prefer to be given more technical input, wherever possible, such as digital               
evidence extractions (forensic disk images). 
The Cyber Crime Team (CCT) was created recently before the needs assessment interviews             
took place. Perhaps as a result, the need to clarify the role of the CCT was a common theme                   
amongst many of the interviews that were conducted. Indeed CCT had no set list of skills                
available or services provided. Although their role was still evolving to meet the demands of               
the force, there was a concern (both within CCT and in other focus groups) that the team was                  
not being utilised according to their technical skills, and instead spending time on tasks              
including social media nuisances calls and assisting officers with authority applications.           
There is a need for CCT to be more actively engaged in cyber-crime related cases. This could                 
include training to conduct investigative interviews, and help direct investigations. CCT           
members should take a more proactive role with increased autonomy to collate cases and              
work with PCs.  
There were also software and hardware needs identified, to improve productivity (including            
access to OSINT tools, digital forensics tools, and larger monitors), and to automatically             
create a record of the work that is done, and to better track and allocate staff to cases. 
Related to communications, as discussed previously, CCT required access to information on            
the service providers the that the Telecoms unit can make request to, with what information is                
available for request. However, in the Telecoms focus group they described being concerned             
that there is also a need to understand in more detail the proportionality that is required to                 
request access to various data sources. Therefore this should also be addressed to avoid              
overburdening Telecoms with requests that would not be granted. This is also related to the               
need for further clarity on legalities and the authorities required for capturing various kinds of               
digital evidence. Also related to communications, in the HMET interviews, it was noted that              
CCT need to improve communications with HMET.  
Given the discussion in previous sections above, there are opportunities for CCT to be more               
actively engaged in TSU and DSU activities: assisting with covert intelligence work. There is              
also the potential for CCT to be involved in cyber training: for example, delivering training to                
analysts. 
4.2. Thematic Analysis of Needs 
In total 125 needs were identified based on the OEM qualitative coding and analysis. These               
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needs were further coded based on a thematic analysis (with multiple codes used to associate               
both high-level and low-level themes). This section reports on the most common themes that              
were identified within the needs. Common themes identified include: knowledge/training,          
communication/roles, recording, software, governance, procedures, resources/staffing, and       
national input. 
4.2.1. Training and knowledge 
The most prevalent theme of need across the entire needs assessment study was the issue of                
training (n=28) and knowledge (n=30). There is a need for more comprehensive cybercrime             
training across the force. The training should take the needs of the various roles across the                
force into account (rather that a one-size-fits-all approach for everyone including those in             
specialist roles), and should use teaching approaches appropriate for the purpose (e-learning            
is perhaps overused, and ad hoc Q&As may be more effective), and much material is in need                 
of updating. Current training should be reviewed to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Existing              
training packages were perceived by many, including an interviewee in the training unit, as              
being outdated and not guaranteed to develop skills. Refresher training should be provided.             
Time needs to be allocated to enable police personnel to engage in the training.  
A modular set of training packages mapped to the needs of police roles, delivered              
face-to-face might enhance the effectiveness of the training. Training should include: 
● The nature, form and impact of cybercrime.  
● General cyber-awareness/knowledge in regards to cybercrime. 
● Advice to give callers, and walk-throughs on selected issues. 
● Preservation of digital evidence: for example, preserving mobile phone data. 
● Further knowledge/training around digital technology (including raising frontline        
awareness of current apps and technology in use). 
● Further knowledge/procedures around social media and online harassment, to improve          
frontline response and advice. 
● Knowledge of cybercrime and how this relates to digital sources of intelligence. 
● Technical content for DFU, CCT, DMI to ensure it contains up-to-date and relevant             
content. 
● Cascading of basic skills around open source intelligence gathering. 
● Further bespoke training according to various role requirements (DSU, TSU, HMET,           
ECU, Frontline officers, CCC, etc), to improve relevant cyber skills. 
● Training should better cover updates in legal and technological issues. 
● Ensure that police dealing with child abuse cases have sufficient cybercrime/digital           
training and support. Training should be bespoke to (or inclusive of) child            
safeguarding and cybercrime. 
● DMIs/CCT (or other intermediaries) need to have increased training regarding          
proportionate means re: data requests, to avoid overburdening Telecoms. 
● Improved training on techniques and tools for cyber attacks. 
21 
Needs Assessment oİ CyĉerĊrime and Diıital EvidenĊe in a UK PoliĊe ForĊe 
CyĉerĊrime and SeĊurity Innovation ɇCSIɈ Centre, Leeds BeĊkett University 
● Improved officer understanding regarding forensic examination outputs. 
● Safeguarding trained to make use of triaging tools. 
● CCT training to conduct investigative interviews, and help direct investigations. 
4.2.2. Communications 
The second most common theme of needs was related to communications (n=28). Within             
this, the most prominent sub-theme was that of role definition and clarity (n=14). There was a                
lack of clarity across the force regarding the roles each cyber-related unit performs, and the               
ways the units support each other and interact with analysts and investigating officers. There              
was a degree of overlap between each of the cyber-related units capabilities and roles,              
including CCT, DFU, DMI, Telecoms, and ECU, and a certain degree of            
governance/ownership ambiguity over responsibilities. This was clearly exacerbated by the          
introduction of new roles (CCT and DMIs), which were yet to fully establish their place               
within the organisation, and the identification of the larger capability issues that these new              
roles were needed to address. It could be argued that it makes sense for each of these units to                   
have related digital expertise. However, there is a need to clarify roles and responsibilities              
regarding cybercrime and use of digital investigation techniques, with a focus on supporting             
frontline officers. Part of the problem is the general lack of cyber-skills within the police               
service, and the subsequent lack of clarity over key terms of reference and definitions.              
Broadly there is need for further clarity or awareness regarding how cybercrime is defined              
within the organisation; overall processes of the units could be enhanced if all the units work                
to the same definition of cybercrime. An identified weakness by the interviewee from Murder              
and Serious Crime related to the lack of joined up knowledge in the organization around               
cyber and digital crime. A related issue is the need for improved communication and              
collaboration between units (including DSU, TSU, CCT, DFU, DMI, Telecoms, and ECU).  
The need for further face-to-face communications was also a common communications           
subtheme (n=5). Much was made by interviewees of the geographical proximity or            
lack-thereof, of units; and it was suggested that the quality of relationships and             
communications between units are enhanced by being physically present. There are technical            
solutions in place, such as video conferencing, which help to increase communications            
between geographically disparate teams; however, it could be argued that more needs to be              
done to improve the working relationships by exploring options to overcome the geographical             
dislocation of the various units. This might be improved through greater use of video              
conferencing or scheduled meetings, to encourage further interactions between units based on            
training or awareness raising of what the work the units are carrying out. The force could                
consider a co-working secondment schedule (for example, CCT/DMI staff working within           
various other units for a few weeks at a time) or semi-structured site-visits, could be used to                 
share knowledge between units, while increasing awareness of the roles and capabilities of             
units within the force. 
Another common communications related subtheme included the need for improved data           
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sharing with Action Fraud. Although Action Fraud plays an important role in assigning cases              
across UK police forces, based on whether there are considered to be lines of enquiry               
available and indication of the suspects location within the geographical regions of forces,             
issues in the way the information flows between forces and Action Fraud was raised in               
interviews with CCC, District staff, CCT, ECU, and trainers, amongst others. Action Fraud             
was described by some as a black hole. There is an issue that crimes that are not escalated to                   
Action Fraud are not included in some national statistics, while those that are reported to               
Action Fraud cannot be tracked by the force to update victims on case progression.  
4.2.3. Quality of recording 
The need to improve the quality of recording of cybercrimes and case data was another major                
high-level theme of need within the force (n=17). A subtheme was that of the correct flagging                
of cases. CCTs work in this area have identified that there has been a vast underreporting of                 
“cyber” related cases. This can be somewhat attributed to the communication and training             
around the issue of cybercrime types (dependant, enabled, facilitated). There was also the             
issue of enabling call takers to better record details of cyber cases, by introducing further               
in-codes for cyber and digital. This was also needs related to the question sets used by call                 
takers, which should be enhanced to request information regarding cyber elements; and these             
question sets might be made mandatory in certain situations. Correct labeling can improve the              
force's response to cybercrime and digital evidence. However, even with the work CCT are              
doing to increase the use of the flagging by officers and by the evaluators in the CIU, there is                   
currently a single “cyber” flag in Niche which covers a very wide range of cybercrimes and                
digital footprints, which has the potential to limit its practical use to direct efforts to support                
investigations. There is a need to allow for more complex flagging of incidents (e.g. in               
respect of allowing multiple labels, and clearer definitions).  
Further context could be made available by linking datasets across the force. This could assist               
call takers via a CRM (Customer Record Management System) which would draw together             
other systems such as Storm and Niche. Similarly, analysts felt that research and analysis              
would be improved through joined up computer systems within the organisation. For            
example, due to a lack of integration, systems like Niche do not communicate with other               
systems meaning that different systems gave researchers and analysts different          
perspectives/answers depending on the datasets they work with. The District Strategic Lead            
was also keen for an altogether more joined up approach to be taken to enhance coordination                
and sharing of knowledge at local, district and regional level. 
The Charter system, which used to record and process authority requests, is also in need of                
workflow changes. Charter should be adapted (with additional workflows) to better suit the             
needs of telecommunication requests, which Telecoms make at volume. Charter currently           
caters best to CAB’s requirements, although CAB have also noted that Charter should be              
modified to include one-sided consensual directed surveillance authorities, and awareness of           
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authority applications in other jurisdictions. 
4.2.4. Software, Governance, Procedures, Resourcing, National     
Input 
Other common themes include: 
● Software (n=12): which covers a range of needs related to software changes,            
including the previously discussed changes to Charter; systems for interacting with           
members the public; monitoring registered sex offenders; improved case         
management; automation of data analysis of digital evidence; Received Data          
Handover Interface (RDHI); automated forensics reporting; and aggregating results         
from various tools. 
● Governance (n=9): which call for top-level input and guidance, such as a review of              
differences between districts' response to cybercrime and child safeguarding (and          
action taken to set an expected baseline); clearer lines of responsibility between police             
and external organisations; strategic reviews to ensure stakeholders are engaged;          
ensuring benchmarking and consistency of the work being undertaken in the           
community and increased co-ordination of how police engage with the public; and,            
review resource management such as the allocation of cases to districts based on             
operational capacity. 
● Procedures (n=9): which involves providing clear guidance on how police should           
perform certain tasks. This includes the need to review processes around filing/NFA            
of cases with a digital element (review whether digital lines of enquiry are being              
sufficiently considered); a clear procedure to receive digital evidence (for example, a            
member of the public taking a USB device to a police station); and, procedures or               
checklists for on site triaging: to ensure Wi-Fi details are captured, NAS and online              
storage is searched/acquired, and hash scans and so on are conducted reliably. 
● Resourcing/staffing (n=8): which is related to whether sufficient resources are in           
place to police cybercrime. This includes access to hardware, such as stand-alone            
machines, and appropriate levels of staffing, such as a question as to whether CCT              
and DFU have the resources to effectively service the force to meet increasing             
demands; assess whether units such as DSU require additional staff specialising in            
technical skills; assessing whether Telecoms have the staffing to proactively support           
the frontline; investing in more training and education; and ensuring that police            
officers and staff make the time for self-directed study. 
● National input (n=5): in addition to governance needs, there are certain inputs that are              
required from a national perspective; this includes, legal interpretation in terms of            
how RIPA applies in various digital scenarios, and the authorities required for            
capturing various forms of digital evidence; national assistance with Home Office           
provided RDHI and ADM systems; increased relationships with additional service          
providers; national guidance and accreditation on the covert cyber capabilities a TSU            
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(or more broadly, a police force) is expected/recommended to have. 
4.3. Discussion 
This section explores how the main themes from existing literature apply to the findings of               
the present research. The themes are ‘Infrastructure’; ‘Resources’; ‘Training’; ‘Interface with           
the Public’; ‘Processes’ and ‘External Contexts’. It should be noted that these thematic             
domains are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
‘Infrastructure’ emerged as a popular theme across the units and interviewees is to             
strategically review the force infrastructure in respect of responding to cyber and digital             
crime. Whilst this issue is implied by HMIC (2015), the findings of this study explicitly               
found it to be perceived as a substantive issue. Although the technological infrastructure was              
largely viewed as being fit for purpose, it was viewed as deficient by some respondents in                
respect of the access arrangements to data held by Action Fraud. Despite this, respondents              
largely felt that the strategic steer given to cybercrime training by the organisation was              
appropriate and that they felt supported by senior leadership. The issue of ‘resources’ did              
become apparent through the analysis of the data as it has in previous literature (see Davis,                
2010, and Harichandran et al, 2016). In particular, the issue of insufficiently skilled human              
resources was raised by a number of respondents and this raises particular challenges of how               
to make sufficiently skilled personnel available at unit level where need is greatest. There              
remains scope to explore how technical knowledge might be made more accessible.            
However, the findings suggest that staff perceive these issues to be partially a result of               
reduced training budgets which had led to a growing use of online training. ‘Training’              
emerged as a particularly prevalent theme, and the most prevalent in terms of needs, across               
the organisation and was identified in previous literature (Davis, 2010, HMIC, 2015). In             
some key areas, such as in the Contact Communication Centre, there was perceived to be a                
lack of structured or formalised training and that this impeded effective practice.As            
mentioned previously, there was substantial reference to online training which was viewed as             
both lacking in effectiveness and as being driven by financial considerations. For some staff,              
current training arrangements were insufficient because of their generic format which did not             
accommodate substantive differences in training needs between different roles. Similarly, the           
pace of technical change raised substantial concerns regarding the tendency of cyber training             
packages to become obsolete quickly. That said, some respondents were quite positive            
regarding opportunities for training, not least in respect of members of the cyber team              
cascading skills more widely. Similarly, relationships with HEIs and private sector           
organisations were seen as potential sources of training and skill enhancement. Likewise,            
online resources and informal workshops provide options for training although          
simultaneously present issues in respect of formally evidencing proficiency in such areas.            
The importance of the ‘interface with the public’, suggested by previous literature, did             
emerge in a limited sense amongst respondents in this piece of work. However, it should be                
noted that it did not emerge as a major issue in the findings and this is probably due to the                    
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fact that this research did focus predominantly on roles and units within the organisation that               
were not explicitly public facing roles 
Through the analysis of the data, ‘processes’ was identified as a substantive theme             
particularly in respect of data recording and sharing, reflecting similar concerns in earlier             
literature (see Stambaugh et al, 2001). Police staff, for example those in the Contact              
Communication Centre and Economic Crime Unit, felt there was a real need for greater              
integration of their systems with those of Action Fraud. Likewise, the Niche system was              
perceived by some as working in isolation of other systems leading to staff, particularly              
researchers and analysts, finding ambiguities in data between different systems. In particular,            
it was suggested that the amount of duplication occurring was leading to inefficiencies. Such              
duplications, in a broader sense, were perceived also to be caused by a lack of clarity over                 
role. At a more strategic level, the ability for cybercrime to transcend local, regional, national               
and international jurisdictions does provide ongoing challenges for data recording and           
sharing protocols. 
‘External Contexts’, as in previous literature, was referred to by participants in the present              
research. For example, as MMIC (2015) found, he role of Action Fraud, and communications              
with the body, was viewed quite negatively, in respect of clarity around the recording              
procedure and access to recorded information. In particular, some kind of liaison between the              
organisation and the police was viewed as potentially helpful. This tends to reinforce As              
Action Fraud is an externally run body the police had no control over the issues that they                 
perceived as being present. The importance of external research contexts is becoming            
increasingly important (see Koper et al, 2009) in terms of police responses and strategies for               
cybercrime. There appeared to be some evidence of the police organisation engaging            
constructively with partners in the local education sector. Legal and legislative issues, as             
identified by Harichandran et al (2016) and Stambaugh et al (2001) were also identified by               
respondents in this study. In particular, concern was raised by the application of The              
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) to the context of cybercrime not least in               
the lack of specific provision for cyber or digital crime. Likewise, the lack of case law to                 
provide a clarifying context was seen as compounding this issue and some respondents would              
welcome guidelines and protocols  to facilitate police interpretation of the legislation.  
One area identified in the literature but which did not emerge as a distinct item in this                 
research was that of ‘certification/accreditation of training’ (see Stambaugh et al, 2001, and             
Rogers and Siegfried, 2004). One potential, but speculative, reason why this might occur             
might be the absence, thus far, of successful legal challenges to police evidence based on the                
skills of police staff. Should such challenges emerge it is likely that accreditation may              
become seen as necessary. Such a shift would see police cyber training move beyond a mere                
skills acquisition remit to one about evidencing competency. This might also be problematic             
in that some of the proposals for overcoming training issues is to resort to less formal training                 
and knowledge acquisition sessions and this would directly contradict any potentially           
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emerging accreditation agenda.  
Conversely, one area arose in the present research that did not emerge in the literature               
analysed for the literature review. This was in respect of the challenges caused by confusion               
of the precise definition of cybercrime. This ambiguity, according to several respondents,            
impacted negatively on organisational responses to cybercrime by making it difficult to            
clearly articulate the role of cyber specialists and, as a result, to create joined up institutional                
knowledge in cyber. Likewise, it was also suggested that this lack of clarity had led to cyber                 
expertise within the organisation being under utilised.  
The literature review highlights the findings of previous research in this area and this has               
allowed for the authors to identify commonalities, and differences, in respect of the findings              
of the present study. What the study did find was that previously identified themes such as                
‘Infrastructure’; ‘Resources’; ‘Training’; and ‘Processes’ and ‘External Contexts’ also proved          
of concern to those who were interviewed for this study. This is significant in that it suggests                 
that such issues may be common to police organisations, and it might be these areas which                
might provide further meaningful data through future research projects. The research also            
found, however, only limited support for the theme, identified by previous literature, of             
‘Interface with the Public’. It is very possible that this theme failed to emerge as a consistent                 
concern in this research due to the fact that many of the units from which data was generated                  
were not public-facing in their remit and thus such concerns were not present. Further              
research might seek to explore the perceptions of front-line staff and officers to a greater               
extent. Likewise, future research might also focus on the experiences of victims of cyber              
crime to help understand the perceived effectiveness and efficiency in respect of investigating             
cyber crime. Finally, it should be noted that this research drew attention to a theme which                
was not identified in previous research, that of a lack of an effective organisational definition               
of cyber crime. Once again, future research might find it helpful to assess the different ways                
in which organisations embed working definitions of cyber crime in their work and how this               
can be supported by the strategic positioning of expert knowledge. 
5. Conclusion 
A needs assessment was conducted within one of the largest UK police forces to investigate               
needs within the cyber-investigation lifecycle: from the experience of the public when            
reporting cybercrime to call takers, through to the attending officers, officer(s) in charge, and              
the many units and roles involved in supporting cybercrime investigations. Results include            
detailed investigation into how specific units and roles are involved in cybercrime            
investigations, and their specific challenges. 125 needs were identified. The needs were            
analysed to provide high-level insights into the issues faced by the police force in tackling               
cybercrime, along with thematic big-picture analysis of the needs to addressing the            
challenges that are faced. 
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Thanks to an openness to the need for improvement from the police, the focus groups and                
interviews produced data that identified a large number of issues within the force, along with               
the practical needs that can be addressed to mitigate those issues. This work was designed to                
be used to directly inform police policy and practice, in order to improve response and               
readiness for cybercrime and digital evidence. Due to the nature of the findings, it is likely                
that these may apply nationally, and this work can be used to reflect on the potential for                 
related issues in other police contexts.  
Furthermore, this work was a foundational component of the CARI Project, and was used to               
inform the research and development projects that were subsequently run in close            
collaboration between police and academia, ensuring the research workstreams were          
informed by and addressed the needs of the police force. 
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Appendix A: Focus Group Interview Script 
Introduction (15 mins) 
● Thank you for your participation 
● Aim of project: to identify ways the force could improve response to cybercrime and              
digital evidence 
● Emphasis is on cybercrime: any crime facilitated by a digital device (for example,             
hacking into a server, or using social media to stalk and bully someone, indecent              
images of children) 
● Determine how things stand now (what you do, and what you are given to do it) 
● How you would prefer things to be (ideally what would you do, and be given to do it) 
● Results will feed through to projects conducted by CCT and DFU, and make             
improvements that will improve the supporting mechanisms in place to help you do             
your jobs 
● We want a wide range of views, honest feedback to lead to improvements 
● Anonymous: no sensitive personally identifiable data will be published. Results will           
be presented in terms of groups of individuals. 
○ Session recorded 
○ All personally identifiable information will be kept private 
● Please read and sign the information and consent form 
[All except CCT/DFU]: How does the [unit/you] relate to a cybercrime investigation? 
For each participant (20 mins): 
● Please briefly introduce yourself and what you do (related to cybercrime cases) 
How things are now (20 mins): 
● What information do you receive as input? (For example, you answer a call and are               
provided with information or receive a report) 
● What do you do with that to actually conduct the work you do? 
○ What supporting information, knowledge or training do you receive? Is it           
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sufficient? 
○ What technology is in place to support you do the work? 
● What do you produce as a result? 
How things should be (20 mins): 
● What information should you receive as input? (For example, other things that would             
help you to do your work) 
● What should be improved in terms of what work is actually done to focus on what is                 
important? 
○ Other supporting information, knowledge or training should you receive? 
○ Other technology that could be in place to support you to do the work? 
● How could the produced reports etc be improved to be helpful to those that receive               
them? 
SWOT (10 mins): 
● What currently works well? (S) 
● What doesn’t work well? (W) 
● Any resources under used? (O) 
● Threats that you see in the future? (T) 
Impact on society (10 mins): 
● How do you see your role benefits the public? 
● Anything you think the force is not achieving or could be doing better? 
Specific questions (20 mins): 
Technical Support Unit: 
● How do you identify new technology to deploy on cybercrime investigations? 
● What are the inhibitors using new technology? Ie does the technology need to be              
certified and approved? Who repairs devices? Costs? 
● What are the issues when using existing technology in houses, such as webcams?  
Covert Authority Bureau (CAB) 
● What are the issues when applying RIPA 2000 legislation to investigations where            
digital devices have been used in the commission of the crime? 
● What are the issues when applying RIPA 2000 legislation to covert Police            
investigations? 
Telecom Unit 
● How do you share knowledge with investigating officers on Telcom’s systems and            
processes? 
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Contact Communication Centre 
● Do you think that members of the public receive a similar level of service when               
reporting cybercrime compared to traditional crimes? 
● Do feel confident that you are able to distinguish a cyber crime which requires Police               
deployment from a cyber crime which requires referral to action fraud? 
District Staff Community Officers , Dedicated control room officers, Investigators 
● What are the issues for officers attending scenes of investigating crimes where digital             
evidence is involved in the crime? Ie capturing evidence, equipment needed to capture             
evidence, application of knowledge of legislation and protocols when capturing          
evidence, adequate training? 
● Do you consider there is a difference between Police response to the public when              
investigating or responding to digital crime compared to traditional crime? 
● How has the increased number of sex related cases involving images shared on             
devices impacted on your work? 
Dedicated Source Unit 
● Do you use Covert human intelligence sources related to cybercrime? Any issues? 
● How do you verify the information that you are provided? 
Conclusion: 
● Thank you for your participation 
Appendix B: Strategic Lead Interview Script 
Introduction 
● Thank you for your participation 
● Aim of project: to identify ways the force could improve response to cybercrime and              
digital evidence 
● Emphasis is on cybercrime: any crime facilitated by a digital device (for example,             
hacking into a server, or using social media to stalk and bully someone, indecent              
images of children) 
● Determine how things stand now (what you do, and what you are given to do it) 
● How you would prefer things to be (ideally what would you do, and be given to do it) 
● Results will feed through to projects conducted by CCT and DFU, and make             
improvements that will improve the supporting mechanisms in place to help you do             
your jobs 
● Honest feedback to lead to improvements 
● Anonymous: no sensitive personally identifiable data will be published.  
○ Session recorded 
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○ All personally identifiable information will be kept private 
● Please read and sign the information and consent form 
How does the [unit/you] relate to a cybercrime investigation? 
Please briefly introduce yourself and what you do (related to cybercrime cases) 
OEM Model Explained -- focus on Products, Outputs, and Outcomes. 
What is: 
● Inputs 
● Process (Means -- such as police procedures and software used) 
● Products (En route results -- such as reports sent through to other police officers) 
● Outputs (organizational accomplishments; measurable things delivered to society --         
such as a criminal conviction) 
● Outcomes (Effects in or for society) 
What should be: 
● Outcomes 
● Outputs 
● Products 
● Process 
● Inputs 
Appendix C: Information sheet and consent form 
Needs assessment of how police handle cybercrime 
Project aims 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this research is to analyse and                 
improve the cyber-investigation lifecycle: from the experience of the public when reporting            
cyber crime, to the call taker, the attending officer, investigator, and the Crown Prosecution              
Service, to identify key knowledge gaps and needs in the policing of cyber enabled crime. 
The current stage of the project involves interviews, focus groups, and surveys to conduct a               
needs assessment. In each case the emphasis is on identifying opportunities for innovation             
and improvements to the investigation and processing of cybercrime. 
The results from this needs assessment will inform the next stage of our project: Cyber Crime                
Team (CCT) and the Digital Forensics Unit (DFU) will undergo research training and will be               
involved in conducting research to improve response to cybercrime across the force. 
Project overview 
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A research and training collaboration has been established between West Yorkshire Police            
and Leeds Beckett University. The collaboration involves implementing a training and           
research programme that will directly impact the capability of the digital forensics and cyber              
units within West Yorkshire Police to understand, critique, and use research, and which will              
impact the support and evidence-based practice that these units provide to frontline officers             
across the region. A research culture and capacity will be developed within West Yorkshire              
Police; and through collaborative knowledge exchange and development, produce research          
results that will provide guidance to enable police forces to process digital evidence more              
efficiently and effectively. Two onsite postdoctoral researchers will work with Leeds Beckett            
academics to collaborate, train, facilitate and guide the cyber investigation units to conduct             
research, and to design process, procedure, tools and a training programme to improve the              
response and investigation of cybercrime. 
Your participation 
You have been chosen to take part in this study, because you are involved in police cases and                  
processes that can potentially involve digital evidence and cybercrime, including cyber           
enabled crime, where crime is enabled by technology. By participating you are helping to              
identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and needs: gaps between the current           
state and an ideal state. 
Your input is very valuable to the project, and we hope you will continue to participate.                
However, you are under no obligation to take part and can withdraw involvement at any               
stage.  
What do I have to do? 
You will be interviewed individually, or in focus groups, and/or complete a questionnaire.             
This will involve answering questions around the processes and outcomes of cybercrime            
investigation, particularly your own role in the process and any potential opportunities for             
improvements. Please be honest in your responses, the aim is to bring about improvements,              
and to do so we need to identify areas of concern.  
Participation is not expected to take longer than a few hours for focus groups or interviews,                
less for surveys. Sessions will be recorded via notes, audio, and/or video. Except where              
separate permission has been granted to publish these recordings, these will not be published              
and will be stored securely. 
Your identity 
Your identity will be anonymised before storage of results and analysis, and no sensitive              
personally identifiable data will be published. Results are normally presented in terms of             
groups of individuals. If any individuals data is presented, the data will be anonymous,              
without any means of identifying the individuals involved. 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
You will be helping us to identify areas for improvement (such as further support or               
technological aides) for yourselves in your day-to-day roles. These results will be used to              
understand how police forces can improve, and we will use this information to design              
projects to bring about improvements within the force, potentially impacting your own            
working environment and the effectiveness of cybercrime investigation. 
This work is also intended to benefit other police forces and researchers: results will be               
published in academic venues, such as peer-reviewed conferences and journals. Results will            
also be summarised and disseminated in presentations, on websites, and in training materials.  
Who is funding the research? 
This research is funded by the Home Office, College of Policing, and Higher Education              
Funding Council for England (HEFCE). 
Ethical review of the study 
The project has received ethical approval from Leeds Beckett University. 
Consent 
I confirm that I have read and understand the above. 
I understand that all personal information will remain confidential and that all efforts will be               
made to ensure I cannot be identified (except as might be required by law). 
I agree that data gathered in this study may be stored anonymously and securely, and may be                 
used for future research. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time                 
without giving a reason. 
I agree to take part in this study. 
 
 
Participant’s name Participant’s signature 
 
 
Date 
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[   ] Please contact me with a summary of findings at the conclusion of the project 
 
Email (if yes above) 
 
For further information contact Dr Z. Cliffe Schreuders (csi@leedsbeckett.ac.uk) 
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